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I estimated inter-brand cigarette demands with nicotine, tar content
and policy event information in Japan during 1950-84. The demand for all
brands increased but the demand for plain (non-ﬁlter) brands decreased
due to the dissemination ofʠA Note about Health Damage from Smoking
ʡ in 1964. The demand for all brands increased but the demand for
high-nicotine brands decreased due to the disclosure of nicotine and tar
content in 1967 and the labeling warnings in 1972, however consumers
had still preferred high-nicotine brands after 1972. Contrastively, the
demand for high-tar brands increased in 1967 but decreased in 1972, and
consumers had switched to prefer low-tar brands after 1972. Disclosure did
not reduce the intake of nicotine but reduced the intake of tar, accordingly
disclosure may beneﬁt consumers by reducing the health risk as tar causes
cancers. In line with changes in inter-brand demands, the monopolistic
ﬁrm discontinued old products with poorer quality (plain, high-tar) but
provided new better ones (ﬁlter-tipped, low-tar).
JEL classification: I18, D12, D82
Keywords: disclosure, nicotine, tar, cigarette, inter-brand, panel estimation,
diﬀerence in diﬀerence1 Introduction
Whether there a need exists for mandatory information disclosure continues to
be hotly debated. Many economists insist, by means of theoretical analyses,
that mandatory disclosure is necessary, and much empirical evidence supports
this view. However, some economists do not accept this claim, and strong
evidence has recently undermined the idea that more information is better.1
Thus, a clariﬁcation of which side of the debate is correct is needed, which has
important implications for policy making and legislation.
In addition to clarifying the debate, this research sought to investigate the
outcome of recent legislation and legal changes regarding worldwide informa-
tion disclosure about tobacco products. The World Health Organization (WHO)
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) was unanimously approved
by all WHO members (192 countries) on 27 May 2003. Over 57 countries, in-
cluding Japan, had already ratiﬁed this treaty by September 2005. The FCTC
seeks to protect human health by reducing tobacco consumption, and has de-
scribed in detail several methods for tobacco control. In particular, information
disclosure and labeling are believed to be important tools. For example, Article
11 states,ʠ... each unit packet and package of tobacco products and any outside
packaging and labeling of such products shall, in addition to the warnings . .
., contain information on relevant constituents and emissions of tobacco prod-
ucts . . . . ʡSuch labeling and information disclosure regulations have been
implemented in Japan since the 1960s and 1970s, respectively. By examining
the eﬀects of these policies in Japan, we can demonstrate directly the validity
of Japanese policy, and also characterize the possible impacts of the FCTC on
cigarette consumption in the world.
Therefore, it is crucial to empirically test how consumers react to the new
1See details in Dranove et al., (2003).
1information releases mandated by Japanese policies. However, it is very diﬃcult
to measure the eﬀects of information disclosure, for two main reasons. First,
the abstract and general nature of information makes it diﬃcult to quantify and
deﬁne. Second, it is hard to separate the eﬀects of information disclosure from
the eﬀects of other factors. For example, even if some information is presented
and has a particular eﬀect, the economy will always change for other reasons as
well; thus, any impact of information is in combination with other factors. As
a result of these problems, research on information disclosure is generally rare
and has been virtually nonexistent in Japan.
Furthermore, one could arrive at the eﬀect of information disclosure on non-
addictive goods by testing its eﬀect on addictive goods. It is commonly believed
that consumer responses in the case of addictive goods are less sensitive to ex-
ogenous information shocks than in the case of general goods, as the consumer
cannot easily give up addictive goods or ﬁnd substitutes for them. Therefore,
in the event of a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of information disclosure on the
consumption of the addictive good tobacco, it would be reasonable to infer the
existence of a similar, but stronger, eﬀect on the consumption of general goods.
With these ideas in mind, this paper proposes a new method for verifying
the eﬀects of information disclosure by incorporating information on product
contents into the demand equation. A diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence (DID) approach
is provided for directly estimating those changes in inter-brand cigarette de-
mands that result from policy changes and increased information awareness
about nicotine and tar levels. Using cross-sectional time-series data, I examined
consumer responses to public information announcements. Because consumers
generally responded to the newly disclosed information, this implies that they
previously had insuﬃcient information. Moreover, results of this study provide
new evidence that mandatory disclosure decreases tar intake and increases con-
2sumer welfare while making monopolistic ﬁrms improve product quality, supply
a greater number of new and better quality products, and discontinue their
products of poorer quality.
The composition of the paper is as follows: section 2 reviews related research,
section 3 describes policy events, section 4 presents the data, section 5 presents
the model and estimation techniques, section 6 reports the estimation results,
and section 7 provides the conclusion and discusses policy implications and
issues relevant to future research.
2 Related Literature
2.1 Theoretical and empirical work
The most inﬂuential theoretical works on the topic of information disclosure
have been those of Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981). When information
disclosure is costless to the seller, when the buyer can costlessly conﬁrm whether
the disclosed information is true or false, and in the absence of moral hazards
on the part of the buyer, Grossman (1981) found that the optimal strategy of
the seller is to fully disclose all information and to provide the buyer with com-
plete quality assurance. In such a case, mandatory disclosure is not necessary,
because it is in the interests of the ﬁrm to disclose all information voluntarily.
However, Verrecchia (1983) introduced a nonzero information disclosure cost
into the standard model and then found that the seller instead chooses to dis-
close information only when the proﬁts from such a decision exceed the costs.
More recently, Fishman and Hagerty (2003) pointed out that in certain situa-
tions, mandatory disclosure may be worse than voluntary disclosure.2 In short,
no consensus has yet been reached in the theoretical literature as to whether
2Akita and Maeda (2005) also have made this argument
3mandatory or voluntary disclosure is the better policy choice.
In contrast, much empirical work exists on the eﬀects of information on con-
sumption. Brown and Schrader (1990) demonstrated that the introduction of
health information empirically helped to explain the phenomenon that egg con-
sumption in the United States decreased despite a decline in the price of eggs. In
their analysis, the accumulated yearly number of articles espousing either of two
opposing viewpoints (that cholesterol is either good or bad for the health) pub-
lished in medical magazines between 1955 and 1987 was indexed as a measure
of information. Yen and Chern (1992) found that the consumption of animal oil
was reduced, and that vegetable oil consumption signiﬁcantly increased, as a re-
sult of the disclosure that cholesterol is bad for the health, using the cholesterol
index of Brown and Schrader (1990) as a proxy for health information. Chern
et al. (1995) then obtained further evidence that health information aﬀected
consumption by using the averages and variances of consumer beliefs as proxy
variables for information measures in accordance with the Bayesian information
model. Ippolito and Mathios (1995) also provided evidence that the dissemina-
tion of information on the negative eﬀects of cholesterol had an eﬀect on food
consumption.
Mathios (2000) recently examined nutrition label information and supermar-
ket scanner data from both before and after the introduction of the Nutrition
Labeling and Education Act. He found that mandatory labeling did have an
eﬀect on consumer behavior and health. However, Dranove et al. (2003) pro-
vided evidence that the public disclosure of patient outcomes decreased patient
and social welfare. Jin and Leslie (2003) used restaurant hygiene grade cards
as a measure of information disclosure and provided evidence that these grade
cards caused restaurants to make hygiene quality improvements, although they
could not directly estimate the demand for restaurant food, due to a lack of
4restaurant price information.
Using American survey data on cigarette consumption, Viscusi (1992) ana-
lyzed the eﬀect on smoking behavior attributable to the disclosure that smoking
is harmful to health. He found that the probability that an informed person
smoked was lower than that for an uninformed one. Furthermore, the introduc-
tion of such information signiﬁcantly decreased cigarette consumption. Yorozu
and Zhou (2002) used Japanese prefectural cigarette sales data and a prefectural
dummy based on whether there was a smoking and health advertising budget as
measures of information dissemination. They found that cigarette consumption
decreased signiﬁcantly in the prefectures with a budget for such advertising.
Along similar lines, Wan (2004) used monthly data and event dummies to ana-
lyze the eﬀect of information on total cigarette consumption and concluded that
information regarding the potential damage due to smoking reduced consump-
tion signiﬁcantly in Japan.
2.2 Departure from previous work
In previous research, advertisements, regulations, and opinion polls were used
as measures of information. In contrast, this analysis uses not only policy in-
formation, such as regulation, but also the contents of goods, as measures of
information. The measures of information discussed in this paper are reliable,
and the measurement bias of this information is low. Furthermore, the estima-
tion approach used here diﬀers markedly from those used in previous research,
in that inter-brand demands are used directly, by means of a DID method.
Although much research related to cigarette consumption has been conducted
using both macro and micro data, there has been no analysis conducted to date
of the way in which nicotine and tar content information disclosure has aﬀected
inter-brand cigarette demand by causing consumers to switch products. This
5inquiry is thus the ﬁrst of its kind.
This paper also diﬀers from that of Jin and Leslie (2003) in three main
respects. First, the estimation approach adopted directly estimates demand
by means of disclosed information rather than by means of estimated revenue.
Second, this paper focuses on an addictive good (cigarettes), while Jin and
Leslie (2003) did not. Third, this paper focuses on the response behavior of
a monopolistic ﬁrm faced with mandatory information disclosure, whereas Jin
and Leslie (2003) focused on relatively competitive ﬁrms (restaurants) under
both mandatory and voluntary disclosure.
3 Main Policy Events Concerning Smoking
Information in Japan
The Japan Tobacco and Salt Public Corporation (JT) is the only cigarette maker
in Japan. It is a matter of established fact that JT is, and has generally been,
unwilling to voluntarily disclose complete information about the quality of its
products. This fact is consistent with the prediction of the standard theory
of information disclosure. Large costs associated with information disclosure
arise for both JT (in measuring cigarette contents and convincing the smoker
that the disclosed information is true) and the cigarette consumer (in verifying
that the information disclosed by JT is true), if there is no government regula-
tion. Therefore, because of these enormous costs of information disclosure and
veriﬁcation, the government must legislate information disclosure and establish
organizations that verify information, such as various governmental inspection
agencies. In addition, a substantial tax should be charged to cover these costs.
The Japanese government has enacted such legislation, and has forced JT to
disclose cigarette content information in accordance with related laws.
6For the purpose of conducting the analysis reported in this paper, three
main policy events pertinent to information about smoking in Japan were used
to measure information eﬀects quantitatively. The ﬁrst occurred on 6 February
1964, when the Ministry of Health and Welfare of Japan disseminatedʠA Notice
about Health Damage from Smokingʡ to prefectural governors and to the mayors
of several designated cities following the release of the U.S. ʠSmoking and Health
Report, ʡwhich was published in 1964. One may consider this publication as
a completely exogenous shock to the consumer, as this was the ﬁrst time that
the government oﬃcially informed consumers about the negative health eﬀects
of smoking.
The second information disclosure event in Japan concerned the nicotine and
tar content of cigarettes. In 1967, the amounts of nicotine and tar per cigarette
were published in the newspapers, as mandated by the Ministry of Finance. One
may also consider this event as constituting a completely exogenous information
shock, for the following reason. Before this disclosure, neither consumers nor
JT possessed information about nicotine and tar levels; nicotine and tar levels
were ﬁrst measured in 1967. Before 1967, both demand and supply sides had
no data concerning nicotine and tar levels. As information regarding the levels
of nicotine and tar had not yet been disclosed, even as late as 1966, it can be
assumed that consumer knowledge of nicotine and tar levels did not aﬀect the
consumption of cigarettes. After 1967, however, it can be inferred that consumer
behavior was inﬂuenced by the new information.
The third information disclosure event occurred on 20 April 1972, when the
Japanese Ministry of Finance issued a directive put a warning label on cigarette
packs. Speciﬁcally, manufacturers were required to add the label,ʠSmoking too
much may be bad for your health. ʡThis warning had to be displayed on the
packs of all brands produced after April 1972, and this mandatory disclosure
7continues today.
Tax revenues were necessary to enforce these policies and to cover the related
costs. Therefore, one may think of part of the cigarette tax revenues as the
costs associated with information disclosure, e.g., veriﬁcation costs. According
to Wan (in press), the price of cigarettes today is completely controlled by the
Japanese government, and special laws are frequently passed to enact cigarette
tax changes. In fact, seven cigarette tax increases have been passed, not because
of ﬂuctuations in the demand for cigarettes, but because of a large public deﬁcit.
Thus, the price of cigarettes is an exogenous variable for the Japanese cigarette
consumer. Therefore, the prices of all brands were included in the estimation
equation, not only to control for eﬀects other than those of information about
nicotine and tar, but also to obtain the variations in price across all brands.
4 Data
The time-series sales data used for each brand came from theʠNational Budgetʡ
and the ʠ History of the Japanese Cigarette Monopoly. ʡ 3 In particular, the
data included information for the period 1950-1984 on the consumption of 55
brands that had more than 95 percent of the total market share after 1960. In
addition, the data included each brand’s price and respective levels of nicotine
and tar. The nicotine and tar-level data were announced oﬃcially in theʠAsahi
Shimbun ʡand theʠ Mainichi Shimbun. ʡ 4
Policy dummies were used to indicate whether disclosure of information oc-
curred, i.e., they were assigned a value ofʠ 0 ʡbefore an event occurred and
designated as ʠ 1 ʡ after the event. A time trend and its square were also
used. Furthermore, macroeconomic factors, such as income and population,
3In Japanese, the ʠ National Budget ʡ is ʠ Kuni No Yosan, ʡ and the ʠ History of the
Japanese Cigarette Monopoly ʡisʠ Nihon Tabako Senbaishi. ʡ
4TheʠAsahi Shimbunʡand theʠMainichi Shimbunʡare the main newspapers in Japan.
The information on nicotine and tar content was obtained from these two newspapers.
8were taken into consideration. The time transitions of nicotine and tar levels
per cigarette are presented in Figure 1. This graph shows that cigarette nicotine
and tar content decreased after 1967, and that the decrease in nicotine levels was
slightly more sudden than that of tar. Figure 2 presents the time transition of
annual per capita cigarette consumption versus annual consumption per smoker.
Cigarette consumption per capita increased until the mid-1970s and then lev-
eled oﬀ. However, cigarette consumption per smoker has been increasing until
the present time.5 The total intake of nicotine and tar per capita is presented
in Figure 3. Nicotine consumption exhibited an upward trend until 1967 but
declined thereafter. This trend then turned upward again until 1972, shifting
to another downward trend thereafter. Tar consumption, however, increased
slowly after 1967 and declined from 1972. The total intakes of nicotine and
tar per smoker are presented in Figure 4. The pattern of nicotine consumption
exhibited similar tendencies to that of tar; this trend increased until 1963 but
then shifted to a downward trend from 1964. However, it is noteworthy that
in 1972, nicotine consumption moved in the opposite direction to that of tar
consumption.
To help assess the subjective changes in consumer consciousness that oc-
curred with the dissemination of new information, I investigated the number of
newspaper articles with headlines containing relevant keywords.6 The number
of articles with titles related to the harmful eﬀects of smoking, or to not smok-
ing, suddenly increased after 1964. There were a few more articles with titles
including the keywordʠnicotineʡthan there were titles includingʠtarʡaround
1967, although the number of articles with titles containingʠ tar ʡincreased
from 1972. It appears that these changes in consumer consciousness correspond
to the changes in the consumption patterns presented in Figure 1, and to the
5Calculation details were presented by Wan (in press).
6I searched keywords in the Asahi Shimbun Database. The data obtained and a graph are
available upon request.
9changes in the total intake of nicotine and tar shown in Figure 4.
5 Speciﬁcation and Estimation Methods
5.1 Modeling the eﬀects of the policy events in 1964, 1967,
and 1972
The response of consumers to the 1964 policy event was likely represented by
the adjustment in total cigarette consumption and inter-brand switching that
occurred. Ideally, consumers should have restricted their consumption of plain
cigarettes, if they only had information regarding plain and ﬁltered cigarettes.
Therefore, plain-cigarette consumers may be taken as a treatment group, with
ﬁltered-cigarette consumers used as a control group.
Similarly, the response of consumers in 1967 to the disclosure of information
about nicotine and tar content levels can be represented by switches among
brands or an adjustment of total consumption following the disclosure of this
information. Once consumers became aware that nicotine and tar were bad for
their health, the demand for brands with a high-nicotine or tar content should
have decreased, while the demand for low-nicotine brands characterizing the
control group should have increased.
Finally, the consumer response to the 1972 warning label on cigarette packs
thatʠ Smoking too much may be bad for your health ʡcan similarly be used
to characterize the market response to the disclosure of nicotine and tar infor-
mation in 1967.
5.2 Econometric model
As noted by Wan (2004), consumer consumption of cigarettes is based not only
on cigarette prices, but also on the available information concerning the dam-
10aging eﬀects of smoking. If one ignores the aspect of addiction, a simple model
for cigarette brand demand can be described as follows: demand for brandit =
f (the attributes of the brandit, policy information, etc.). The attributes of the
brand and relevant policy information can be used as proxies for the extent of
consumer knowledge about the harmful eﬀects of smoking.
Dit = β0 + β1 ∗ time + β2 ∗ time2 + β3 ∗ priceit + β4 ∗ incomet + β5 ∗ after64
+β6 ∗ plaini + β7 ∗ after64 ∗ plaini + β8 ∗ after67 + β9 ∗ nicotineit
+β10 ∗ after67 ∗ nicotineit + β11 ∗ after72
+β12 ∗ after72 ∗ nicotineit + ai + uit. (1)
Two assumptions may also be made:
Assumption 1: E(uit|xitj,a i)=0 ,
Assumption 2: Cov(xitj,a i)=0 ,
where the x are explanatory variables and j = 1, 2, ..., 12, is the number of
explanatory variables; i = 1, 2, ..., 55; t = 1, 2, ..., 35. The two assumptions
presented above are consistent with the characteristics of the sample. It can
easily be veriﬁed that Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisﬁed by the sample used, as
the explanatory variables are the attributes of brands and policy information.
The variables used in the estimation were constructed as follows. ʠ D ʡ
denotes the annual demand for each brand, divided by the Japanese population;
ʠtimeʡis a time trend for the years 1950, 1951, ..., 1984;ʠtime2ʡis the square
ofʠtimeʡdivided by 100;ʠpriceʡis the nominal price of each brand divided
by the consumer price index (CPI);ʠincomeʡis Japanese per capita disposable
income divided by the CPI;ʠafter64ʡis a time dummy, which equals 1 for the
period after 1964 and 0 otherwise;ʠplainʡis a dummy for plain brands, which
11equals 1 if the brand was plain and 0 otherwise; ʠ after64*plain ʡis a term
for the intersection of after64 and plain; ʠ after67 ʡis a time dummy, which
equals 1 for the period after 1967 and 0 otherwise; ʠ tar ʡis the tar content
of each brand as disclosed in the newspapers;ʠ after67*tar ʡis a term for the
intersection of after67 and tar;ʠnicotineʡis the nicotine content of each brand
as disclosed in the newspapers;ʠafter67*nicotineʡis a term for the intersection
of after67 and nicotine; ʠ after72 ʡis a time dummy, which equals 1 for the
period after 1972 and 0 otherwise;ʠafter72*tarʡis a term for the intersection
of after72 and tar; and ʠ after72*nicotine ʡ is a term for the intersection of
after72 and nicotine. The number of observations, maximum value, minimum
value, average, standard error, and so on, for each variable, are summarized in
Table 1.
5.3 Information on nicotine and tar content before 1967
In 1967, the nicotine and tar content of only existing brands was tested. Thus,
information on nicotine and tar content before 1967 is lacking. Therefore, the
assumption was made that the nicotine and tar content prior to 1967 was equal
to the value disclosed in 1967. Given that nicotine and tar levels are the primary
characteristics of a cigarette brand, JT may have chosen to produce new brands,
rather than change the content of its old brands; JT would have incurred large
costs in changing the components of an existing brand.7
Accordingly, consumers could not “see” information about nicotine and tar
content before 1967, but it would be reasonable that they might estimate the
content of their favorite brands to some degree by their taste sensations. To
capture this eﬀect, I use information about nicotine and tar content in 1967 as
a proxy for the one prior to 1967.
7See theʠ History of the Japanese Cigarette Monopoly ʡ(Tabako Senbaishi in Japanese)
for details.
125.4 High correlation between nicotine and tar
It is reasonable that cigarette consumers should generally choose brands based
on their information about nicotine and tar content. As high-nicotine brands
always have a higher tar content, tar content is strongly and positively correlated
with nicotine content. In fact, the coeﬃcient of correlation in this case is 0.9261.
Therefore, the possibility of multicollinearity arises when nicotine and tar are
both included in a regression equation. In consequence, either nicotine or tar
was dropped from the model to control for this potential problem.
However, the coeﬃcient of correlaton is not equal to 1, it also makes sense
that the estimation is performed including both nicotine and tar. If eithor
nicotine or tar is dropped from the model, the issue of an omitted variable may
arise. Thus, I make three estimations and then compare their results to control
for these issues.
5.5 Data unavailable after 1984
Data from 1985 are not available, because JT has not disclosed its inter-brand
cigarette sales information since its privatization in 1985. If the information dis-
closure events considered in this paper were unrelated to JT’s privatization, then
the obtained estimators should be consistent.8 It is reasonable that these events
should have been independent, because JT’s privatization was mainly caused by
trade conﬂicts and the trade-liberalization talks that took place between Japan
and the United States in the 1980s.9 Partially relevant information is also avail-
able from the following Web address. http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/gyokaku/1006kiki2-
besi.html
8See Chapter 17 of Wooldridge (2002) for details.
9See theʠ History of the Japanese Cigarette Monopoly ʡ(Tabako Senbaishi in Japanese)
for details.
135.6 Unobserved (potentially existing) samples
The observed sample is unbalanced because new brands were introduced and
some old brands were withdrawn from the market at diﬀerent times. The de-
mand for discontinued brands or those that had not yet been introduced could
not be observed. This observation indicates a typical selection bias problem, as-
suming that the introduction and discontinuation of brands was a choice made
by JT. Under the assumption that JT ʟ s strategy for the introduction and dis-
continuation of brands was based on the observed information x in equation (1)
and the unobserved time-invariant ai, a relevant ﬁxed-eﬀects estimator should
be unbiased.10
If JT’s strategy for the selection of brands were based not only on the infor-
mation in equation (1), but also on the unobserved time-variant growth rate of
demand, the following random growth model would be more suitable.
ln(Dit)=γ0 + γ1 ∗ time + γ2 ∗ time2 + γ3 ∗ ln(priceit)+γ4 ∗ ln(incomet)
+γ5 ∗ after64 + γ6 ∗ plaini + γ7 ∗ after64 ∗ plaini + γ8 ∗ after67
+γ9 ∗ ln(nicotineit)+γ10 ∗ after67 ∗ ln(nicotineit)
+γ11 ∗ after72 + γ12 ∗ after72 ∗ ln(nicotineit)
+gi ∗ time + ai + uit. (2)
Here,ʠ ln ʡdenotes the natural logarithm, and gi is the potential growth rate
of brand i. An estimation of this speciﬁcation was also performed.
5.7 Estimation methods
For the purpose of estimating equation (1), ﬁxed-eﬀects (FE, where Assump-
tion 2 is not required) and random-eﬀects (RE) panel estimation techniques
10See Chapter 17 of Wooldridge (2002) for details.
14were used. A Hausman-Wu test was used to identify which speciﬁcation was
superior.11
In the estimation of equation (2), the ai were removed via ﬁrst-diﬀerencing;
this diﬀerenced equation was then estimated using FE (with the gi removed)
and RE methods. In this process, the variables time and time2 in equation (2)
became constant, as did time in the diﬀerenced equation.
5.8 The monopolistic ﬁrm’s strategy for the selection of
brands
Pooled ordinary least squares (POLS) estimation was used to determine how JT
selected new and discontinued brands in response to the mandatory disclosure of
nicotine and tar content information. A new brand dummy (new brand), which
equals 1 at the time of the ﬁrst observation of a new brand and 0 otherwise, was
constructed, in addition to a discontinued brand dummy (discontinued brand),
which equals 1 when a brand was observed for the last time and 0 otherwise. The
dependent variable was taken to be either nicotine or tar, while the independent
variables included time, the square of time, after67, after72, the new brand
dummy, and the discontinued brand dummy, which characterized JT’s strategy
of brand selection. These estimations were essentially diﬀerence tests for the
nicotine and tar content of discontinued brands, as well as those of new and
existing brands, both before and after 1967 and 1972, that were performed to
verify whether there were signiﬁcant diﬀerences.
11Even though FE estimators are sometimes accepted by the Hausman-Wu test, RE esti-
mation results may also be robust in this context because nicotine and tar levels are nearly
time invariant.
156 Results and Their Explanation
6.1 Panel estimation with level data
Table 2 presents the results of the panel regressions using level data. The
ﬁrst and second columns contain results regarding nicotine, while the third and
fourth columns contain results concerning tar. The Hausman-Wu test for the
estimation with nicotine accepted the RE formulation. Note that the coeﬃcients
forʠafter64,ʡ ʠafter67,ʡandʠafter72ʡfor this case are signiﬁcantly positive,
as indicated in the ﬁrst column.12 Similarly, the Hausman-Wu test for the
estimation with tar ﬁt the FE formulation, and the coeﬃcients forʠ after64 ʡ
andʠafter72ʡpresented in the fourth column are signiﬁcantly positive. These
results imply that the policy events of 1964 and 1972 both increased cigarette
sales. However, the coeﬃcient forʠafter67ʡin the fourth column is signiﬁcantly
negative and is opposite in sign to the coeﬃcient in the case of nicotine, implying
that the coeﬃcient forʠ after67 ʡis sensitive to whether nicotine or tar was
considered, and that the variableʠ after67 ʡmay have been highly correlated
with nicotine and tar content itself. Thus, it is not clear whether the sale of
cigarettes truly increased after the policy event of 1967.
In the ﬁrst column of the same table, the coeﬃcients forʠpriceʡandʠin-
comeʡare not signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient forʠplainʡis signiﬁcantly positive,
but the coeﬃcient forʠ after64*plain ʡis signiﬁcantly negative. The sum of
the estimated coeﬃcients forʠplainʡandʠafter64*plainʡis signiﬁcantly neg-
12Due to the event in 1964, consumers signiﬁcantly switched to ﬁlter-tipped cigarettes. The
ﬁlter-tipped cigarette would be feltʞ light ʟcompared with the plain brands when the other
factors were the same, thus smokers would smokeʞ more ʟto keep theʞ smoking or nicotine
stockʟin their bodies. The other reason might be the consumersʟillusion, that is, theʞﬁlter-
tipped ʟwere consideredʞ safer ʟ , thus the smoker could smoke moreʞ safer ʟ(ﬁlter-tipped)
cigarettes under the same health risk. Even though consumers still preferred high-nicotine
brands after 1972, but coeﬃcients on ʞafter67*nicotineʟ and ʞafter72*nicotineʟ are signiﬁcantly
negative, respectively. These results implied that consumers switched to lower-nicotine brands
after these policy changes. Those consumers had to consume more lower-nicotine cigarettes
to keep or smooth the intake of nicotine as shown in Figure 4.
16ative ( ʠ plain ʡ+ʠ after64*plain ʡ= 123.194, standard error = 63.004, p =
0.051), which suggests that the sales of plain cigarettes decreased signiﬁcantly
and implies that smokers started to buy ﬁltered cigarettes after the policy event
of 1964. The coeﬃcient forʠ nicotine ʡis signiﬁcantly positive, but the coeﬃ-
cients forʠafter67*nicotineʡandʠafter72*nicotineʡare signiﬁcantly negative.
The sum of the coeﬃcients forʠ nicotine ʡandʠ after67*nicotine ʡis signiﬁ-
cantly positive ( ʠnicotineʡ+ʠafter67*nicotineʡ= 143.294, standard error =
26.569, p = 0.000), which suggests that the demand for high-nicotine cigarettes
increased signiﬁcantly after the policy event of 1967. The sum of the three co-
eﬃcients forʠ nicotine,ʡʠ after67*nicotine, ʡandʠafter72*nicotine ʡis also
signiﬁcantly positive ( ʠnicotineʡ+ʠafter67*nicotineʡ+ʠafter72*nicotineʡ
= 57.521, standard error = 25.952, p = 0.027), which suggests that the demand
for high-nicotine cigarettes increased signiﬁcantly, even after the policy event
of 1972. These results indicate that the sales of high-nicotine brands decreased
signiﬁcantly compared to those of low-nicotine brands, after the introduction of
the information disclosure regulations in 1967 and in 1972; however, consumers
generally still preferred high-nicotine brands.
In the fourth column, the coeﬃcient forʠpriceʡis negatively signiﬁcant. The
coeﬃcient forʠincomeʡis not signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient forʠafter64*plainʡ
is signiﬁcantly negative and implies that the sales of plain cigarettes decreased
signiﬁcantly after the policy event of 1964. The coeﬃcient forʠtarʡis positive
but not signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient forʠ after67*tar ʡis signiﬁcantly positive,
but the coeﬃcient forʠ after72*tar ʡis signiﬁcantly negative. The sum of the
coeﬃcients forʠ tar ʡandʠ after67*tar ʡis signiﬁcantly positive ( ʠ tar ʡ+
ʠ after67*tar ʡ= 13.631, standard error = 3.510, p = 0.000), which suggests
that the demand for high-tar cigarettes increased signiﬁcantly after the policy
event of 1967. The sum of the three coeﬃcients for ʠ tar, ʡʠ after67*tar, ʡ
17andʠafter72*tar ʡis positive but not signiﬁcant ( ʠ tar ʡ+ʠafter67*tar ʡ+
ʠafter72*tarʡ= 4.333, standard error = 3.651, p = 0.236), which suggests that
the demand for high-tar cigarettes did not increase signiﬁcantly after the policy
event of 1972. These results indicate that the sales of high-tar brands increased
signiﬁcantly after the introduction of the information disclosure regulations in
1967 but decreased signiﬁcantly after 1972 compared to those of low-nicotine
brands. The increased availability of tar information decreased sales of high-tar
brands following the warning-label legislation of 1972; in fact, consumers have
not signiﬁcantly preferred high-tar brands since 1972.
The ﬁfth and the sixth column present the result when both nicotine and
tar are simultaneously included in the estimation. RE and FE estimation are
performed, but the FE result is accepted by the Hausman-Wu test. The obtained
related coeﬃcient sums areʠnicotine ʡ+ʠafter67*nicotineʡ= 108.747 (p =
0.019);ʠnicotineʡ+ʠafter67*nicotineʡ+ʠafter72*nicotineʡ= 122.305 (p =
0.002); ʠtarʡ+ʠafter67*tarʡ= 2.793 (p = 0.609) andʠtarʡ+ʠafter67*tarʡ+
ʠafter72*tarʡ= - 10.80214 (p = 0.024). These results imply that the consumers
prefer high nicotine and low tar brands after 1972. It is nearly consistent with
the results in the ﬁrst and the fourth column.
I sum up above ﬁndings here. Due to information disclosure, smokers switched
to prefer brands with lower nicotine and lower tar, and they increased cigarette
cosumption; as a result, smokers smoothed or kept their intakes of nicotine,
just as shown in Figure 4. As smoking rate decreased, total intake of nicotine
and tar per capita decreased after information disclosure as shown in Figure 3.
By contrast, total intake of nicotine per smoker almost did not decreased, and
total intake of tar per smoker only decreased slightly. The consumers’ intake of
nicotine is consistent with the addictive nature of nicotine.13
13Rational addiction hypothesis is empirically supported by cigarette consumption in Japan.
See Wan (2005) for details.
186.2 Panel estimation with growth rate data
Table 3 presents the results for the panel regressions of equation (2) using growth
data. The ﬁrst and second columns present the results of the estimations in-
cluding nicotine, while the third and fourth columns contain the results from
the estimations including tar. The Hausman-Wu test accepted the RE estima-
tions (second and fourth columns). The estimated coeﬃcients forʠ∆ln(price)ʡ
andʠ∆ln(income)ʡare signiﬁcantly negative and positive, respectively, which
means that the inter-brand price elasticity for cigarettes was -0.474 and the
corresponding income elasticity fell between 2.343 and 2.409. Theʠ constant ʡ
has a signiﬁcantly positive sign and corresponds to the time trend of equation
(2), thus implying that cigarette sales exhibited a signiﬁcant growth trend. The
estimated coeﬃcient forʠtimeʡis signiﬁcantly negative and corresponds to the
square of the time trend in equation (2), implying that the trend of the sales
growth was nonlinear. The coeﬃcient forʠ∆after64ʡis signiﬁcantly negative,
and this implies that the growth rate of cigarette sales signiﬁcantly decreased
after 1964. The coeﬃcients forʠ∆after67,ʡ ʠ∆after72,ʡandʠ∆after64*plainʡ
are not signiﬁcant.
In the second column (FE estimation with nicotine), the coeﬃcients for
ʠ∆ln(nicotine),ʡ ʠ∆after67,ʡandʠ∆after67*ln(nicotine)ʡare not signiﬁcant.
However, the coeﬃcient forʠ ∆after72*ln(nicotine) ʡis negatively signiﬁcant,
and this implies that the growth rate of the cigarette sales of high-nicotine
brands did not signiﬁcantly change in 1967 but signiﬁcantly decreased after
1972.
In the fourth column (FE estimation with tar), the coeﬃcients forʠ∆ln(tar),
ʡʠ ∆after67, ʡandʠ∆after67*ln(tar) ʡare not signiﬁcant. However, the co-
eﬃcient for ʠ ∆after72*ln(tar) ʡ is negatively signiﬁcant, which implies that
the growth rate of the cigarette sales of high-tar brands did not change sig-
19niﬁcantly in 1967 but signiﬁcantly decreased after 1972. In the sixth column
(FE estimation with nicotine and tar), the coeﬃcients on ʠtime,ʡ ʠ∆ln(price),ʡ
ʠ ∆ln(income) ʡandʠ constant ʡare signiﬁcant and close to the ones in the
second and the fourth columns. The other coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcant. It
may be caused by the multicollinearity or by too many parametors.
From the information in Table 3, one may conclude that the policy events
of 1964 and 1967 did not have signiﬁcant eﬀects on the growth of inter-brand
cigarette demand, while the growth rate of the demand for high-nicotine and
high-tar brands decreased due to the policy event of 1972. Since a consumer’s
choice of brand requires information regarding nicotine and tar levels, one may
infer that the eﬀect in 1972 was ancillary to that of the 1967 information disclo-
sure. The consumer could not have chosen a brand based on nicotine and tar
contents if such content information had not been released in 1967.
6.3 Impacts on the monopolistic ﬁrm
During the period of voluntary disclosure (before 1967), JT did not disclose
content information. In contrast, JT disclosed all information regarding nicotine
and tar content during the period of mandatory disclosure (after 1967). It is
noteworthy that the number of brands on sale increased continuously throughout
both periods, and that the rate of increase became greater after the mid-1960s.
Furthermore, the annual average sales of each brand decreased continuously.
In other words, JT supplied more brands after the introduction of mandatory
disclosure. Moreover, changes also occurred in the composition of consumer
demand for plain versus ﬁltered cigarettes. Before 1964, 3 plain brands were
introduced, but after 1964, there were no new plain brands. Only 2 ﬁltered
brands were introduced before 1964, but after 1964, 47 ﬁltered brands were
introduced. Thus, JT supplied more ﬁltered brands and fewer plain brands
20after the policy event of 1964. In addition, graphs of the time transitions for the
number of discontinued and new brands indicate that remarkably large numbers
of new brands were introduced in 1964, 1967, and 1972.14 No brands were
discontinued before 1972, but many were discontinued thereafter. These facts
imply that JT introduced many new brands in response to the events of 1964,
1967, and 1972 and discontinued many brands in response to the policy event
of 1972. Finally, the average nicotine and tar content of both discontinued and
new brands indicates that a transition occurred in favor of low tar and nicotine.
In particular, the average nicotine content of the discontinued brands was higher
than that of the new brands, implying that JT discontinued many high-nicotine
brands and introduced many low-nicotine brands. Similarly, the amount of tar
in the discontinued brands was on average higher than that of the new brands,
implying that JT discontinued many high-tar brands and introduced many low-
tar brands.
After 1967, 20 brands were discontinued, while 39 new ones were introduced;
only 13 brands had been introduced before 1967. Using a diﬀerence test, it
was possible to determine that the nicotine and tar content of the cigarettes
that were discontinued after 1967 was higher than that of the newer brands.
Moreover, it was likewise determined that the nicotine and tar content of brands
introduced before 1967 was much higher.
To formally test the above implications, four estimations were performed
using POLS. The results of these estimations are summarized in Table 4. The
ﬁrst and second columns contain the results for the nicotine content of new
and discontinued brands, while the third and fourth columns present the results
for tar content. In the third column, the coeﬃcients for ʠ after67, ʡʠaf-
ter72, ʡ and ʠ new brand ʡ are signiﬁcantly negative, but the coeﬃcient for
ʠ discontinued brand ʡ is signiﬁcantly positive. These results imply that JT
14The graphs are available upon request.
21supplied more lower-nicotine brands and discontinued higher-nicotine brands.
In the fourth column, the results are very similar to those in the second column
and imply that JT supplied more lower-tar brands and discontinued higher-tar
brands.
It seems contradictory that consumers still preferred high-nicotine brands,
and that JT nonetheless discontinued brands of this type and instead supplied
low-nicotine brands.15 However, this may actually be a rational response by
JT: ﬁrstly, high-nicotine brands also tend to be high in tar, and consumers
dislike high-tar brands. In fact, the growth rate of high-nicotine brands was
signiﬁcantly lower than that of other cigarettes. Secondly, if consumers switch
to consume low nicotine brands, they have to consume more cigarettes to smooth
the intake of nicotine because of nicotine’s addictive nature; Thus, JT may sell
more cigarettes and get much larger proﬁt. This strategy of brand selection
would be consistent with JT’s proﬁt maximiziton.
7 Conclusion and Policy Implications
By incorporating information on product contents into the demand equation,
this paper has presented a new way to test the eﬀects of information disclosure
on consumption. Moreover, this new methodology was used to test the eﬀects of
mandatory information disclosure regulations on Japanese inter-brand cigarette
demand. The main ﬁndings are as follows.
In 1964, the demand for all cigarette brands increased, and the demand for
plain cigarettes decreased, due to the dissemination ofʠA Notice about Health
Damage from Smoking.ʡ The growth rate of the demand for all brands decreased
from 1964. Compared with that for low-nicotine brands before the information
disclosure, the demand for high-nicotine brands decreased due to the mandatory
15This point was ﬁrst argued by Takeo Hoshi.
22disclosure of 1967, and also decreased due to labeling warnings that were im-
plemented in 1972. However, consumers greatly preferred high-nicotine brands
before the information disclosure; in fact, consumers still preferred high-nicotine
brands even after the events of 1967 and 1972. The growth rate of high-nicotine
brands did not change signiﬁcantly in 1967 but did decrease signiﬁcantly after
1972. Compared to that for low-tar brands before the information disclosure,
the demand for high-tar brands increased due to the mandatory disclosure in
1967 but decreased due to the labeling warnings in 1972. The total eﬀect was
that consumers generally did not prefer high-tar brand cigarettes after 1972.
The growth rate of high-tar brands did not signiﬁcantly change in 1967 but
signiﬁcantly decreased after 1972.
In harmony with the change in consumer preferences caused by the disclo-
sure of information about the health eﬀects of smoking, JT also supplied more
and better-quality products and discontinued products of poorer quality by sup-
plying more ﬁlter-tipped, low-tar (nicotine) brands and discontinuing plain and
high-tar (nicotine) brands.16 This JT’s strategy is consistent with its proﬁt
maximiziton because if consumers switch to consume low nicotine brands, they
have to smoke more cigarettes to keep the intake of nicotine and then JT may
sell more cigarettes.
These results are consistent with the time transitions that occurred in the
average nicotine and tar per cigarette, total nicotine intake, and the tar per
capita and per smoker. This suggests that the cigarette consumer had an in-
suﬃcient amount of information before the disclosure events took place, as the
mandatory disclosure of information resulted in a decreased intake of tar per
capita and per smoker.
The policy implications of this paper are as follows. The mandatory disclo-
16Medical research has corroborated that low-tar cigarettes are of ʠ better quality ʡthan
high-tar brands, as tar is a cause of cancer; thus, ﬁltered cigarettes are better than those
without ﬁlters because ﬁlters remove some of the tar and other harmful ingredients.
23sure of information about smoking is likely to decrease the incidence of cancer
caused by tar intake and increase consumer welfare, if consumers always choose
their favorite cigarettes. Thus, mandatory information disclosure is both im-
portant and indispensable. These regulations are of great importance to the
consumer in light of the current lack of information provided to consumers,
and they should also force monopolistic ﬁrms to improve the quality of their
products by shifting consumer demand.
In closing, there are two major issues that were not been addressed in this
study. The ﬁrst is that the addictive nature of smoking was not considered in the
estimated model. It would be interesting to introduce the eﬀect of information
disclosure into the framework of Becker et al. (1994) or Wan (in press). The
second issue is that the approach of Yen and Chern (1992) should have been
used to estimate information eﬀects. However, when this approach was used,
data limitations became a major problem, because the data set has too many
brands, too many missing values,17 and a very short time-series.
17This is also a typical attrition issue. See Kawaguchi and Neumark (2004) for details.
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